In the course of a Saturday night in December, officials of the security system (Sicherheitsapparat A future historical account will praise the precision of the attack, the perfect selection of the moment, and the able carrying-out of the action. The historians will describe til** consistency with which all the resistance of the enemy was broken, and the poets will sing praises to the great military triumphs of this army, which through its struggle achieved the victory in the streets of Danzig, in Warsaw factories, in steel mills, coal mines, and in the shipyards. General Jaruzelski increased the fame of the Polish military by occupying the Warsaw radio station and television station along with the central telephone system building in one skillful maneuver. Truly, since the battle of King Sobieski near Vienna in 1683, none of our leaders have been able to claim such successes. Now the musicians will compose symphonies, the painters will immortalize the victorious attacks, the film directors will shoot patriotic films, and all for the honor of the leaders of the December night. The Council of State will doubtlessly introduce a new medal-for participation in the campaign of December 1981.
But we don't want to joke. Although the government propaganda strikes exactly such a tone, we want, even while still bewildered and shocked, to ask ourselves about the meaning of what has happened in Poland.
For in the night of the 12th to 13th of December the communist power elite began despairingly to defend its position as the ruling class, its power, and the privileges bound up with this power.
The status of the power elite--one doesn't need to ground this in detail-was being threatened, and indeed, not only in Poland, but in the entire communist block. The DecemberPutsch didn't have so much to do with the aim of realizing the communist Utopia, but was rather a classic counter-revolution against the workers for the defense off the conservative interests of the anclen regime. Contrary to the official propaganda, this was in no way the response to an attempt to take over the political power: Solidarity had at its disposal neither a shadow cabinet nor a plan for a coup d'etat.
The genesis of the December chaos begins with the fundamentally unresolvable conflicts between a millions-strong social movement organized in Solidarity and the totalitarian structure of a communist state. But the fact of the existence of an independent and self-administered institution supported by the people was unacceptable. The issue here wasn't, then, that of power itself, but authority (Machtvollkommenheit), and consequently, the limits of the party nomenclature, with the style of the exercise of power, and, therefore, with the rule of law, with the meaning of the compromises concluded between the governing and the governed-so, about pluralism in social life, about the structuring of self-administration in the factories and at other levels of social life.
The realization of the reform program, which included all these areas, put the fundamental principle of communist leadership over state and society in question.
It was obvious that the power-structure (Apparat) wouldn't ever freely relinquish even a little bit of its power and the conflicts were consequently unavoidable.
We thought, however, that matters would take a different course. We didn't believe that the power-structure (Machtapparat) would attempt to resolve social conflicts with military power by using the argument of power instead of the power of argument. This is not the first crisis in the history of the communist states. Nevertheless, anyone who compares those events which occured twelve years apart, first in 1956, then the Prague Spring, and now the 15 months in Poland, can, despite some similarities, also see some significant differences. Common to each of these situations was the desire for an expansion of national and civil rights. The differences lay in the dynamic of the social changes. For the Poles he was a spokesman for their national and democratic desires. In Hungary the opposition of the Stalinist wing in the power-structure (Apparat) led to a situation in which the revolution in the streets began to dictate the tempo of the changes. The power-strueture (Machtapparat) fell apart like a house of cards. The Soviet intervention was a direct consequence of this fact.
In Czechoslovakia in 1968 it was a circle of the power-structure inside the party (Kreise des Apparats innerhalb der Partei) that noticed that the economic inefficiency of the communist system and its susceptibility for waste and backwardness would increase unless there were deep conceptual reforms. The essense of the conflict in Czechoslovakia lay in the desire of the liberal and victorious faction of DubXek-which was supported by the entire society--for democratic reforms from above together with a lessening of the dependence on Soviet centralization. The Czechoslovak!an "socialism with a human face" had many faces: from a tempered reformism of the party machine (Apparatschiks) to a pluralistic vision of society, as could be found in the writings of nonconformist journalists. The determining factors, however, were the opposition of the Czechoslovak!an leaders to the dictates of the Soviets and their desire to seek the legitimation of their power in the support of their own society and not only in the official chambers of the Kremlin.
It was different in Poland. It is hard to speak of a "socialism with a human face" here; it was previously a "communism with its teeth knocked out", a communism which could no longer bite and defend itself against the assault of organized society. This social presure had nothing to do with the use of force. The central point of the program of these opposition circles-the most popular of which was the "Committee for the Defense of the Workers" (KOR), which was formed after the strikes in June 1976-lay in the desire to change the society and to rebuild social connections outside the official structures. The central question wasn't, "how can one reform the system of the use of power?", but, "how can one defend oneself from this system?" This way of thinking effected the course of the August strikes, the form of the strike demands, the program, and the strategy and tactics of Solidarity. The passionate struggle for the reform of the totalitarian structure lasted 15 months. The high point of the struggle was as equally untypical as its course. The official declaration of war on the society stemmed from the nature of the preceeding conditions. War, according to Clauseqitz, is the continuation of the politics pursued in peacetime with other means. This time it was a war against the organized society taken up by a state which is an instrument of the organized political power of the Warsaw Pact. The analysis of the mistakes which Solidarity made will long remain a topic of Pölich political discussions. For the people and a woman-to recall the appropriate formula from Karl Marx--will the moment of neglectfulness never be forgotten in which they allowed a scoundrel to rule them.
The union, actually a front for national solidarity, bore in itself the good and bad sides of that society which gave birth to it; a society which for 37 years has lived estranged from every democratic institution and outside the sphere of political culture; a society which was systematically lied to, stultified, and humiliated; a society which is at the same time obstinate and deliberate, in which honor, freedom, and solidarity have the highest values and compromise is all too frequently equated with capitulation and being a renegade.
Solidarity was a democratic movement of the world of the workers, which functioned in an anti-democratic environment, inside the totalitarian structure of a system whose only understandable legitimation lay in the agreements of the Yalta Conference. The Poles don't need to be reminded on the contents of these agreements, as Mr.
[Henri] Nannen* did recently, who seems to think that human rights are due only to those who live west of the Elba, while the whip and barbedwire remain reserved as appropriate instruments to regulate the mechanisms of public life for the barbarians of the east. The Poles haven't forgotten Yalta. The problem nevertheless existed of how to translate the realities of Yalta into a contemporary language. That was not simple.
The powerful, spontaneous social movement, which shaped itself from one day to the next without a model and in the middle of on-going conflicts with the powerstructure (Machtapparat) had no unequivocal, welldefined stage-by-stage goals and no clear conception about coexistence with the communist regime.
It allowed itself to be easily provoked into discussions about unimportant things and there existed many superfluous conflicts within it, much disorder, inefficiency, and a lack of knowledge of the opponent and his methods of action. Solidarity could strike, but it couldn't wait. It had a command of the techniques of direct attack, but not that of retreat.
It had fundamental ideas, but no program for stage-by-stage actions. It was a Collossus on steel feet, but with hands of clay.
It was powerful in the factories, inside the workers' groups, but helpless at the bargaining table.
It had an opponent which wasn't in the position to tell the truth, to hold the economy in gear, or even to fulfill its own obligations, but which could do one thing: smash the social solidarity to pieces. It had learned this art to perfection in its 37 years in power.
This opponent-the power-elite-was morally and financially bankrupt, and was, because of its political weakness, incapable of realizing any political program. This political weakness was understood by Solidarity as a general weakness, whereby one forgot that an apparatus of power (Apparat der Gewalt), untroubled by democratic corrosion, can be a useful instrument in the hands of a dictatorial power, and above all in the hands of a dictatorship which finds itself in hot water.
The communist system in Poland was a Collussus on clay feet, but with iron hands. When they demanded democratic elections of the parliament and the people's councils, the officials of Solidarity seemed to forget that such slogans set off an alarm signal in the ruling class and announced their soon-to-come end. We repeat: Solidarity never demanded that the communists be expelled from the government and that the State be replaced with the administrative structure of the union (Gewerkschaftsapparat). Nevertheless, it is a problem that the governing cliques (Apparatschiks) read such a program into the declarations of Solidarity-but it is now unimportant to what extent it must have been so.
They noticed the pressure of the political base (Drang der Basis) to disolve the party committees in the factories; the specter of the elections for the people's councils frightened them; they had nightmares about [the possibility of] a national referendum concerning the form of self-administration; and they saw that a drastic raising of prices was due. Their response to all of this was the coup of December, the last response at their disposal. Solidarity didn't expect a military coup and was taken completely by surprise.
The workers' groups don't carry the responsibility for this, but all those who, like the author, were called upon on the basis of their intellectual activities to form the political vision of the union, do.
The theoretical reflections-this only as a parenthetical comment-on the topic of changing the system limped along behind the events. Except for on-going slogans there was hardly any political reflection. Praxis finally overtook theory-and not for the first time in the history of Poland.
The fundamental, if also never clearly defined, conflict within Solidarity concerned the tempo of the changes and their extent.
At the beginning the adherants of a compromise solution were in the majority, but in time it became obvious that the power-structure (Machtapparat) interpreted every inclination to compromise as a weakness. Every concession had to be extorted through strikes or the threat of strikes.
The constant strikes, skillfully provoked by the power-structure (Machtapparat), wore down the society, which was exhausted by the difficulties of every day life. Positive results in the form of detectable improvements in the quality of life didn't appear and this led to polarization and put the meaning of this tactic in question. One group would say: "No more strikes, that accomplishes nothing." The other said: "No more ineffective strikes, we need a general strike, which will force the government to essential concessions."
It is hard to say which group was the largest, but it is certain that the second group was the most vocal. And exactly that group, mostly young workers from large factories, demanded radical action from the leadership of Solidarity, which became harder and harder to hinder (although Walesa and Kuron attempted to do this).
The power structure ( What did the communists think of Solidarity? The August crisis was no surprise to them, although the course of the strikes, the maturity of the demands, the discipline and solidarity of the workers' groups shocked them. For the Gierek regime, which came to power on the wave of the bloody uprising of the dock workers in 1970, it was a dogma to avoid an armed confrontation with the working-class. The recognition of an independent union in 1980 was an act of desperation accompanied by the belief that it might be possible to limit this movement to the coast of the Baltic and eventually manipulate and destroy it from within. Vlhen the wave of strikes in August then forced the recognition of a unified union at the national level, the power-structure (Apparat) could only hope to wear it down with provocations and to split it from within. Solidarity presented a deadly threat-it dissolved (liquidierte) the fundamental principle of communist ideology that the communist party represents the working class.
The plan to destroy the union with "political means" failed. However, the constant conflicts-over political prisoners, free Saturdays, and the registration of the farmers' union--just like the personality conflicts, inspired from outside, weakened the union. But in no way did this improve the situation of the power-structure (Apparat): for it, already hopelessly divided and poisoned by the struggle for power, there arose a predominating problem--the party.
The party, understood as the organized community of its members, was not at all present during the August strikes.
This instrument, which in earlier times was useful to the power-structure (Apparat) as a means to break down the social solidarity, had itself broken down this time.
In its attempt to bring the party back to life the power-structure (Apparat) actually opened up the proverbial Pandora's Box.
On the one hand, there was the attempt to find a scapegoat, which led to the publicizing of the ever more shocking proofs of corruption in the Gierek regime. On the other hand, party members began to turn their membership cards in, or worse yet, to integrate themselves into the "structure of the bases" (Basis-Strukturen), which demanded the democratic reform of the party, a cancelling (Aufhebung) of the Stalinist model that the powerstructure (Apparat) had used to defend its position of absolute power.
In this situation we can finally see the fundamental differences between the recent events in Poland and the crises of the years 1956 and 1968. Then the communist leaders (Nagy, Gomulka, Dubceck) were in the position to gain for themselves the trust of the society; those in the group who favored party reform from above had public support at their disposal. But in Poland the entire party dragged itself along behind the changes.
The party didn't stimulate the changes in society; it was instead a social movement outside the party (PVAP) that brought changes in the party line. The reform program of the party was-from the perspective of the goals of Solidarity--a crass anachronism.
The party reformers in Poland formed no unified camp. Among the people who were designated as reformers were such different individuals as Andrzej Werblan, one of the ideological dictators in the era of Gomulka and Gierek, the well-known journalist Stefan Bratkowski, one of the organizers of the discussion circle "Experience and Future" and chairman of the journalists' union, Wojciech Lamentowicz, a 36-year old scientific fellow in the party school, and Abigniew Iwanow, party secretary and leader of the August strikes in a factory in Torun.
But despite their differences, they all became sacrifices to the paradox that belongs to the fate of communist reformers throughout the world: they demanded the reform of a totalitarian party in the name of human freedom and social justice--against the-bureaucratic structure (Apparat) which supresses freedom of thought and creativity and prefers mediocrity and corruption. For this reason they could only attack the powerstructure (Apparat) effectively if they organized a collective movement, but not in a faction which fought over the power. As a faction they automatically hung on outside the party and were additionally compelled to use in daily political battles the same practices which they sharply criticized when used by opponents. The "base-structures" (Basisstrukturen) of individual party cells were an attempt to solve the problem of the squaring of the circle. But they were too weak to succeed and wholly unacceptable to the power-structure (Apparat); they couldn't hold together against the massive counter-attack of the conservative structure of the party. This is exactly what they built on. The idea was for a Front of National Understanding, the pillars of which should have been the power-structure (Machtapparat), the Church, and Solidarity, which was symbolised by the meeting between Jaruzelski, Primas Glemp, and Walesa. That was the last attempt to outmaneuver the union "without bloodshed". The Catholic Church, the greatest moral authority in Poland--and additionally strengthened because of a Polish Pope--was inclined without doubt to a compromise solution. It endeavoured to build bridges for an agreement, to sub-due tensions, and to be a moderating influence on both the power-structure (Machtapparat) and Solidarity. But it should have been a compromise, not a renunciation by the union of its principles and goals. For the common lists suggested by the power-structure (Machtapparat) for the September 1981 municipal elections represented nothing else but such a renunciation-a solution which the Church couldn't and didn't want to support. That was the turning point. For the union it became clear that conflict was unavoidable; to the power-structure of the state (Staatsmacht) it seemed obvious that the possibility of a compromise had been taken as far as it could be.
One must concede that the action taken in the night of December, to which the total unscrupulousness of its executors had contributed, went off perfectly. With tanks and bayonets the union was "pacified", the resistance of the workers in the factories was broken. This triumph of the power-structure (Apparat) can, however, have unexpected consequences.
It could become proof of political short-sightedness. With a bayonet one can spread fear, terrorize, kill and strike victorious blows against an unarmed people. But one sits badly on a bayonet--a thought from Talleyrand that Stefan Bratkowski used to quote. And with a bayonet, we add, one can't pick out the memory of 15 months of freedom from the people.
We have already looked for an answer to the question of how the state power (Staatsmacht) was able to break the resistance in such a short time.
Besides the shock of surprise and the conviction that the spilling of blood is a barrier for all Poles that shouldn't be stepped over, there was still another factor that determined the course of events: the shadow of Russia. The problem of Soviet intervention was often discussed.
Press reports confirmed daily the unmistakeable intentions of Moscow. We knew that Solidarity was not loved in the Kremlin.
There were conflicts over the assessment of the intentions of Soviet policy, which in the Afghanistan conflict was involved in internal difficulites and a complicated international game. There was no clarity in this.
Some of us quietly pursued the hope that it might be possible to create a model Polish-Soviet relationship in which a place might be given for Poland as a free state (als Subjekt). We also believed that the Soviet Union would only decide in favor of armed intervention in an extreme situation, in the event of a civil war or an attempt to take over pov/er. We were of the opinion that those who held power in Poland had hastily used the frightful picture of the Soviets in order to achieve the psychological affect of an intervention without an intervention.
The course of events proves that these considerations were rational: the Soviet Union did everything possible to conceal its participation in the December coup. The scenario that it played from was optimal in the view of the Soviets: "the Poles have made a solution to their problems for themselves".
[ As everyone else, we have also entered into a new situation because of the "Polish-Jaruzelski War", as its called in the Warsaw venacular. It is difficult today to come to a unified formula for action.
Everyone must answer the question before his own conscience of how he is to oppose such evil.
Only each of us alone can decide how he is to defend the dignity of man, how he will act in this strange war, which-one must constantly remind himself of this-is a new incarnation of the centuries old battle between truth and falsehood, between freedom and the use of force, between dignity and humiliation.
We repeat, therefore, that in this war there is indeed no final victory, but also no final defeat-and in this belief there is a precious bit of optimism. The belief that there can be no final defeat has moved me to write out these reflections. This is my contribution in this war. I will certainly not be able to speak my mind so soon again. For this reason I wish my friends, most of all those persecuted and struggling, much strength, so that they can walk boldly through the darkness that lies between hope and despair.
And also much patience, so that they can learn the difficult art of forgiveness. 
